Written as a term paper for a class entitled "Phenomenology and Existentialism," submitted and presented at two student conferences in the winter of 2006.
Abstract:
Written off as a continental philosopher by many steeped in the analytic tradition, Martin Heidegger is laughed at for, among other things, flagrant instances of contradiction in his writing. “What is Metaphysics?” might be considered one example of this. Heidegger argues here that metaphysics is concerned primarily with an entity called the nothing, which he defines as “the negation of the totality of beings.” This idea has, at least in my conversations with other philosophers, been met with rolling eyes.
In an attempt to undermine the closed-minded attitudes of both continental and analytic philosophers, I argue in the following that Heidegger’s argument is actually supported by set theory, a mathematical logic. I will first represent Heidegger’s position. Second, I introduce set theory and the concept of the empty set. Finally, I show how this set allows us to talk about Heidegger’s ‘the nothing’ without contradicting ourselves.
‘The Nothing’ and the Empty Set"
‘The Nothing’
Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics?” is concerned with the “prescientific”1 nature of metaphysics. To begin answering his title question, Heidegger extracts a conception of nothingness by describing the scientific approach as the following:
That to which the relation to the world refers are beings themselves—and nothing besides. That from which every attitude takes its guidance are beings themselves—and nothing further. That with which the scientific confrontation in the irruption occurs are beings themselves—and beyond that nothing…What about this nothing? Is it only a manner of speaking—and nothing besides?2
Because science is concerned with beings in the world (that which is and nothing else) Heidegger finds a niche for metaphysics: a discourse concerned with that which lies beyond the physics, the “beings themselves”— a discourse concerned with that which is not. Heidegger, to further explicate his interpretation of metaphysical discourse, goes on to ask: “How is it with the nothing?” Known throughout the essay as ‘the nothing’, he defines this centerpiece of his argument as the “negation of the totality of beings.”3 This set of ‘negated beings’ is, for Heidegger, the set with which metaphysics should concern itself. But Heidegger notes that
In our asking we posit the nothing in advance as something that ‘is’ such and such; we posit it as a being. But that is exactly what it is distinguished from. Interrogating that nothing—asking what and how it, the nothing is—turns what is interrogated into its opposite. The question deprives itself of its object.4
In other words, the question “how is it with the nothing?” contains the relation ‘…is…’ which contradicts the very idea of ‘the nothing’—which is not by definition. In other words: “…the ‘proper’ nothing itself—is not this the camouflaged but absurd concept of a nothing that is?”5 This problem of contradiction is a serious monkey wrench in Heidegger’s definition of metaphysics: How can we talk about something that is not something by definition? How do we employ our verb ‘to be’ when discussing a thing that necessitates the negation of this verb? Heidegger responds to these questions by citing the “intellectual” necessity of negation. To make his discussion of ‘the nothing’ viable he skirts the problems of logical contradiction by arguing that negation is an activity of the intellect, and that ‘the nothing’ should be considered because of this:
…the proposition that contradiction is to be avoided, universal “logic” itself, lays low this question [concerning ‘the nothing’]. For thinking, which is always essentially thinking about something, must act in a way contrary to its own essence when it thinks of the nothing…Is not the intellect the taskmaster in this question of the nothing?6
While citing negation as an intellectual activity is a clever way to make discussion of ‘the nothing’ possible, Heidegger does not satisfactorily rid his argument of contradiction. If thought is thought of something, how are we to wrap our brains around nothing? While Heidegger is able to continue his discussion of ‘the nothing’ through a series of questions surrounding the origin of negation and ‘the not’, the thorn of contradiction persists. Throughout his discussion one is left wondering: Is there a way to remove it?
2) The Empty Set
In the first few pages of the essay, during his discussion of science and other pursuits, Heidegger writes that
Mathematical knowledge is no more rigorous than philological-historical knowledge. It merely has the character of exactness which does not coincide with rigor.7
We might interpret this to mean that mathematics does not have the capacity to reveal anything about the essence of phenomena, using Husserl’s interpretation of “rigor” as a guide. But while mathematics might lack this phenomenological rigor, its exactness or strict use of deductive proof actually helps Heidegger overcome the aforementioned problems of contradiction in his ‘the nothing’. Set theory, a mathematical logic that “first of all…can be used as a vehicle for communication,”8 provides a way of referring to ‘the nothing’ that follows validly from set-theoretic axioms.
First, what is a set? Machover defines it as “a definite collection, a plurality of objects of any kind, which is itself apprehended as a single object.”9 Potter uses the term “aggregation” to refer to this idea more generally.10 We find aggregation all over the place. Take a gaggle of geese for example. The referent of the word ‘gaggle’ is the group of geese as a singular entity, one thing composed of other individual things (like this or that gosling).11 The term “collection,” as Machover is employing it, refers specifically to a group of things considered as a single object. As Potter remarks, “A collection…does not merely lump several objects together into one: it keeps the things distinct and is a further entity over and above them.”12 Thus ‘gaggle’ refers to one thing composed of many things: the single set (the gaggle) of several geese—that is, the gaggle (like a set) is counted as one thing.
Second, what is the empty set and how does it follow deductively from the axioms of set theory? David Lewis defines the empty set as “the set-theoretical intersection of x and y, where x and y have no members in common.”13 In other words: imagine two gaggles of geese that share no goslings in common. The empty set is the set of the goslings the two gaggles share. To get a bit more technical, Machover defines the empty set as the following:
If n is any natural number and a1…..an are any objects, we put {a1…..an} = df{x: x = x or x = a1… x = an} In particular, for n = 0 we get the empty class { } = {x : x does not equal x} which we denote by O.14
O is a set. Clearly, O is included in any class, and in particular any set…Hence O is included in some set, and by the Axiom of Subset is itself a set.15
In English: the empty class is defined as the group of things that are not themselves ({x: x does not equal x}). And because this group can be found in any collection of objects (that is, there is always room for nothing in any collection), by a set-theoretical axiom we deduce that this collection is itself a set: the set of nothing. Lewis continues to note (with language rarely found in texts on mathematical logic) that the empty set can also be thought of as “a little speck of sheer nothingness, a sort of black hole in the fabric of Reality itself…a special individual with a whiff of nothingness about it.” 16 17
Again, Heidegger’s definition of ‘the nothing’ is “the negation of the totality of beings.” Given the definition of the empty set as the set of things that are not themselves, it is difficult to ignore the similarities between “the set of nothing,” a set-theoretical entity that refers to all things that are not; and “the negation of the totality of beings.” The former, an entity in a logic used for purposes of communication, can be used to refer to the latter. Thus mathematical logic can alleviate the aforementioned worries about Heidegger’s ‘the nothing’.
To head off some initial concerns: this paper does not equate Heidegger’s ontology with that of set theory. In fact set theory, as Potter notes, is a language used to communicate about objects. This is a point in harmony with Heidegger’s comment concerning mathematical knowledge’s lack of rigor—that is, it is difficult to make claims about the metaphysical status of other objects (like geese) using mathematics. Set theory is thus an ideal tool for Heidegger’s arguments because it is a language with which we can logically interpret his idea of ‘the nothing’.
But with such an unusual (and by no means obvious) correlation between a phenomenological account of metaphysics and a branch of mathematical logic, a more careful explanation of arithmetic and how it helps Heidegger is necessary to make this connection clear.
3) Zero, Absence, ‘the Nothing’, and the Empty Set
A simple way of thinking about numbers, such as zero or one or two, is that they are a method of counting. Numbers quantify objects in the world: they account for the presence of things. For instance, take the statement “there are two cumquats in the basket.” ‘Two’ in this sentence tells us how many objects, namely cumquats, there are in the basket. There are also no elephants in the basket. Zero, then, is a number that tells us how many elephants are in the basket: none.
Bringing the discussion back to set theory, one might say that the empty set is the set of all the elephants in the basket. If we wanted to talk about the set of all things that are not in the basket, we would use the same language: the empty set is the set of all things that are not in the basket. Straying now from the basket image entirely, it is clear that the empty set is the set of all things that are not—it is the set of nothing.
This brings us back to Heidegger. As has been noted several times, Heidegger defines ‘the nothing’ as “the negation of the totality of beings.” To alleviate the problems of contradiction in Heidegger’s concept of ‘the nothing’, I think it is possible to adopt a set-theoretical understanding of it.
To restate the problem at hand: how are we to discuss a concept called ‘the nothing’ when thought necessarily thinks of something? If we remember the empty set at this point and conclusion from section two, we should be able to speak logically about the collection of negated things: we can just refer to the ‘the nothing’ with the empty set and continue the discussion without issue. But can the empty set really refer to “the negation of the totality of beings”? Perhaps a better question to address before this one is: Where do Heidegger’s ideas meet the quantificational realm of mathematics, and how does this meeting ground provide a sturdy platform on which Heidegger and set theory can be brought together?
Heidegger writes that
We can of course think the whole of beings in an ‘idea,’ then negate what we have imagined in our thought, and thus ‘think’ it negated. In this way we do attain the formal concept of the imagined nothing…18
If we were to imagine ‘the nothing’ as such, we might picture a cloudy mass with no particular shape or size. Here, again, we find that we are thinking about something that is nothing. This is a problem also present in the concept of the number zero: to what does zero really refer? If it refers to simply nothing, then it still seems to be the case that this nothing is something because a word is used to refer to it and words necessarily refer to things. So this confusion about zero ends up being somewhat short-sighted: zero refers to the absence of things—not just absence. We experience the absence of things all the time, and thus we experience the nothing all the time: “we do know the nothing if only as a word we rattle off everyday.”19 The number of elephants in the basket is one case, but there are countless others. For example, the number of red letters on this page is zero. The number of dogs in my last philosophy lecture was zero. The number of books that I have read by Dan Brown is zero. Indeed, when we ask if are there any red letters on this sheet of paper the answer, given that there are none, is some variation of: there are not any red letters on the paper. So when we negate a thing (not-red letter, not-dog, not-elephant, etc) the linguistic result is that we have no-thing. We refer to a thing’s absence with an absence—the fact that it is not present. Zero is how we deal with this absence in arithmetic. It is here, where zero and negation meet, that Heidegger’s metaphysics meets mathematics.
The most important connection here is between the reference of the word ‘zero’ and the definition of ‘the nothing’ because it is parallel to the connection between ‘the nothing’ and the empty set. If we imagine sets as circles, like Venn diagrams, the empty set refers to the number of things that two non-overlapping circles share: nothing (remember the gaggles of geese sharing no goslings in common). The empty set is the collection of all things that are not quantified as one: all the red letters on this page, the dogs in my last lecture, the number of Dan Brown books I have read, etc. Going back to Machover’s technical definition of the empty set “for n = 0 we get the empty class { } = {x: x does not equal x},” remember that the empty class is at the zero value in a numbered collection of objects. The empty set is thus a singular entity that refers to all things that are absent. In other words: it is a collection whose members are no-things. Now we see more clearly how the empty set refers to Heidegger’s ‘the nothing’: the former refers to a set of things that are not and the latter refers a group of things that are not. Here, it is hard to see how the empty set could not be utilized as a theoretical aid for Heidegger’s account of metaphysics.
But, one might ask, is there a philosophical difference between the presence of a thing and the being of a thing? In other words, can we equate the mathematical concept of presence with Heidegger’s concept of being? Heidegger writes that “the nothing…is nonbeing pure and simple.”20 These questions highlight the differences between the philosophical approaches of a set theorist and a phenomenologist like Heidegger. If mathematical presence (denoted by any number greater than zero) and being (which denotes an extremely complex existential state of affairs) are similar, then zero does in fact refer to the negation of a thing as Heidegger means it when he writes “nonbeing…pure and simple.” But are nonbeing and absence similar in this regard? This is a significant issue that deserves much attention. But a thorough response to these questions would entail an analysis of Heidegger’s conception of being and the mathematical philosopher’s conception of existential quantification. Such an analysis is not within the bounds of this essay, but, again, is deserving of close attention.
While this issue remains up in the air, there are several more concrete problems with the present account. First among them is that Heidegger explicitly says the ‘the nothing’ is not an object: “The nothing is neither an object, nor any being at all.”21 In the definitions provided here of the empty set, all have called the empty set an object or entity that is quantifiable as one thing. This is a problem for the claim that there is a relationship between the empty set and the nothing. However, as mentioned in the beginning of the paper, the ontology of set theory is not identified with that of Heidegger’s here. The claim is merely that set theory provides a logical way of referring to the nothing, which is supposedly an incoherent entity. While it appears to be the case that ‘the nothing’ is something and therefore a dubious topic for philosophical argument, the empty set is an entity (also composed of nothing) that is used to refer to the collection of objects that are not; and it is confidently and extensively written about by logicians of axiomatic set theory. So whether or not the empty set is a being does not necessarily affect its use as term with which we can talk about ‘the nothing’.22
Logicians, however, disagree about how to interpret the empty set; that is, how it fits into the rest of set theory. Lewis, for instance, claims that set theory need only be thought of as “memberlessness” in set theory to do the empty set’s work.23 These differing interpretations might limit the empty set’s helping power. If it is supposed to refer to the nothing, and some of interpretations of the empty set (like Lewis’) have little to do with its characterization as “the collection of things that are not,” then the relationship between the two (that one refers to the other) is less clear. This matter of interpretation is certainly a problem. But consider the Machover quotation cited several pages ago that stipulates nothingness as being present in any grouping: “Clearly, O is included in any class and in particular any set…” That absence should be accounted for in set theory makes some sense. Recall the basket of cumquats. If there are no elephants present in that basket, that must be accounted for. While there are quite a few no-things in the basket (no-pterodactyls, no-Japanese babies, no- stalagmites, the list goes on) it is clear that nothing, to some extent, is present in the basket (because there are no Japanese babies, stalagmites, etc). So it goes with any set or class. And while it is not mandatory according to Lewis that nothing be accounted for in set theory, it certainly makes things much easier. In fact, in set theory, it is possible to derive the entire set of natural numbers (one, two, three, four… all the way to infinity) from nothing. As Lewis himself remarks
You better believe in it [the empty set], and with the utmost confidence; for then you can believe with equal confidence in its singleton, the class of that singleton and the null set, the new singleton of that class, the class of that new singleton and the old singleton and the null set, and so on until have enough modeling clay to make the whole of mathematics.24
As noted above, nothing is always present in collections of things. Given this, along with the very fact that the empty set is interpretable at all, the differing interpretations of the empty set do not present debilitating problems for the present account. So the empty set and ‘the nothing’ can, in fact, still have a working relationship.
4) Conclusions
Heidegger, in his definition of metaphysics, posits the “negation of the totality of beings” despite its seemingly contradictory status. The empty set is follows deductively from set theoretic axioms as an entity in mathematical logic. I have shown in the above that the latter allows us to speak logically about former.
By offering this conclusion I hope to, at the very least, inspire a dialogue between experts in the streams of philosophy at play in it. Too long have the minds of both analytic and continental philosophers been closed in this regard, and too long have they been oblivious to what each might be able to offer the other.
Friday, December 28, 2007
Friday, December 21, 2007
Draft of Reading List--by Steve Wood and David Backer, emailed to Backer on March 29 2006
Gaaaak! A Philosphical Positivism Reading List (a working draft):
1) Law and Truth – Dennis Patterson
2) Real Knowing – Linda Alcoff (and other works)
3) Structuralism and Philosophy for the Human Sciences – Peter Caws
4) Must We Mean What We Say? – Stanley Cavell (and other works)
5) The Inclusion of the Other – Jurgen Habermas
6) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” – Harry G. Frankfurt (and other works)
7) Subj: Frege and Husserl - Dagfin Follesdale
8) Truth – Simon Blackburn (we add Blackburn because he takes Nietzsche seriously, although his thinking elsewhere and in other chapters of this book suggest a non-positivism)
Possible Positivists? (which we only know by reputation)
1) Hubert Dreyfus
2) Paul Taylor
For a positive reading list (which may be composed of non-positive books) check out www.nodogs.org
1) Law and Truth – Dennis Patterson
2) Real Knowing – Linda Alcoff (and other works)
3) Structuralism and Philosophy for the Human Sciences – Peter Caws
4) Must We Mean What We Say? – Stanley Cavell (and other works)
5) The Inclusion of the Other – Jurgen Habermas
6) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” – Harry G. Frankfurt (and other works)
7) Subj: Frege and Husserl - Dagfin Follesdale
8) Truth – Simon Blackburn (we add Blackburn because he takes Nietzsche seriously, although his thinking elsewhere and in other chapters of this book suggest a non-positivism)
Possible Positivists? (which we only know by reputation)
1) Hubert Dreyfus
2) Paul Taylor
For a positive reading list (which may be composed of non-positive books) check out www.nodogs.org
What Philosophical Positivism Is--proposed flier emailed to Steve Wood March 28 2006
What Philosophical Positivism is.
A presentation and discussion of something you might’ve heard about.
Wednesday March 29, 2006
Phillips 414A
630pm-830pm.
“The release of the individual mind to a sense of not only its value but of its preciousness will cause [a great] change. Such a revolution is on the way. No system of policing and conditioning can long survive… The minds of individuals must and will be free.”
-John Steinbeck, from “I Am a Revolutionary”
“…At last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an open sea.”
-Friedrich Nietzsche, from “The Gay Science”
Sponsored by the High School Philosophy Seminar
A presentation and discussion of something you might’ve heard about.
Wednesday March 29, 2006
Phillips 414A
630pm-830pm.
“The release of the individual mind to a sense of not only its value but of its preciousness will cause [a great] change. Such a revolution is on the way. No system of policing and conditioning can long survive… The minds of individuals must and will be free.”
-John Steinbeck, from “I Am a Revolutionary”
“…At last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an open sea.”
-Friedrich Nietzsche, from “The Gay Science”
Sponsored by the High School Philosophy Seminar
Email to Peter Caws, April 21 2006
Hi Prof Caws, attached to this email is the manifesto I told you about when I saw you last. I thought you might find it interesting. Look forward to hearing your thoughts!
Dave Backer
The following document was attached to the email that Backer sent to Caws.
PhiPos Synopsis As of Now
Philosophical positivism is a school of thought that deals with the following:
1) Meta-philosophical questions, such as: What do we do when we do philosophy? Or, a more normative question: What should we do when we do philosophy? What is philosophy and what isn’t philosophy? How does philosophy and philosophical activity relate to the world, how has it come to that particular place, and what’s to come?
2) Personal questions such, as: What does it mean to be a philosopher? How should we approach our philosophical research and how should the academy relate to the world at large?
3) More general questions, such as: What does it mean to be and be human? What is the situation of the human in our world as we experience life?
Philosophical positivism is characterized by particular arguments relating to these general questions. The following are short positivist responses to them.
1) The history of thought, over the past few generations, has produced a markedly deconstructive variety of theories that have taken apart our philosophical methods, view points, and practices piece by piece. All the ideas (constructive and deconstructive) that have shaped the history of thought up till now compose what positivists call the field of ideas. Rather than deconstructive, philosophical positivism is a reconstructive philosophical approach. Positivists argue that when we do philosophy, we should reconstruct—that is, we should look at the various and sundry ideas that have been created via construction and deconstruction (the field) over time and find similarities (what might be called conceptual correlates) in what seem to be disparate areas. These areas are currently (and hurtfully) separated by walls built by philosophical traditions. Postivists believe these walls are transparent, and that the seriousness with which they are currently taken in the philosophical community disrupts philosophical activity, and has muddled what it means to be a philosopher.
2) Reconstruction requires a particular attitude towards ideas and people that is inclusive, and views the production of human thought as a unified whole with many different aspects. Particular attributes are necessary for maintaining this view point. Being a philosopher, positivism says, means having a philosophical attitude. This attitude allows one to do reconstructive philosophy, as well be open-minded, serenely confused, and interested in the entire field of ideas. An important positivistic claim here is that if you do not have arguments to discount a particular way of thinking that meet your own standards of philosophical rigor, then you are not justified in discounting that way of thinking—to others or to yourself. In fact, we believe that it is counter-philosophical do have a sarcastic or closed-minded attitude that is not justified by rigorous argumentation. Therefore, positivists claim, if you persist in maintaining unexamined preference in philosophical research, writing, teaching, and interpreting and convey those unjustified opinions to others then you have lost the philosophical attitude and are not a philosopher.
3) Positivism predicts that the finding of conceptual correlates in seemingly disparate areas of the field of ideas will produce new and interesting conclusions about what it means to be human. When symmetry is found between different locuses of thought within the field we may be in a position to conclude that a greater, more important facet of the human situation has been found. Therefore, reconstruction aims generally to reconstruct a theory of being human.
Essay
Seeing the field of activity, the wanting to take elements seriously and put them together to say something about being. Philosophical positivism is about an approach, an understanding, open-mindedness, connections. We've deconstructed enough! We need to put ourselves back together! This is the work of philosophers.
We've exhausted deconstruction. It has led us to ‘clarity’ of thought, but has it brought us any closer to that which we seek? To the knowledge that drives us? What it means to be human? We’ve taken things apart in our paranoia and, I think, in our passionate deconstructive search of language, we've lost sight of something. We’ve lost sight of why we started deconstructing in the first place—what led us to begin this incredible task of taking apart language and method. We’ve lost sight of the reason why we started doing philosophy in the first place. Now we need to blaze a new trail with our old companions, the traditions of philosophical thought. We need to join together and observe the richness of the field of ideas with open eyes for each of its components.
What is the field of ideas? It is the landscape containing each of the conceptual structures that have developed over the history of human thought. It is the frothing, conflicting amusement park of realisms, mysticisms, logical hierarchies that have been offered by thinkers over time. Some of these structures are those that were constructed to deconstruct earlier theories. Over time, theories have been offered, and theories about the problems with these theories have been offered. The latter are those deconstructive philosophies that alert us to the ambiguities of language, the inability of language to express what we want to express and express it honestly. These stand in the same company of those ancient, medieval, and modern theories that were supposed to be dissolved by the deconstructive ones. Now we stand at a point in history where we can see a tradition of deconstruction and survey the territory. This vantage point must be taken advantage of. It must be utilized. We must now reconstruct, observing all theories up till now and piecing together the disparate sections to produce new ideas within and without our home theoretical territories.
The seers of the field must let no unargued opinion close their minds. We must not be blinded by unkempt and rusty idols passed down to us by our myopic teachers. Cast aside presupposed conceptions of theoretical legitimacy—our search should be one for knowledge and elucidation independent of the halls of tradition. We must seek to learn in whatever direction our thoughts take us, and we must seek the relationships between different ideas: for these connections are the strongest bonds between the progressive thoughts and the reliable, but slightly battered and worn-out positions of thinkers past. To seek in this way is to enter into research without the blindfolds of unjustified preference. To help others seek in this way is to teach what it means to enter research thus.
To seek in this way, to see the field of ideas, to reconstruct properly we must revisit what it means to be philosophical, to be a philosopher—what it means to possess a philosophical attitude (PA).
The PA is an attitude of wonderment; it is a gentle, naive, paradoxical trait. Possessing entails the love of wisdom, whether this is the sparkling pattern of lights on a building, the relationships between mathematical formulae, logical proofs, or inspiring bits of literature, art, conversation, or pop culture. The philosophical attitude is an attitude that condones meeting each and every medium, school of thought, or person on its own ground. The philosophical attitude is curious about the world, and therefore seeks to find out from each and every disparate locus of thought what that locus has to offer. It slanders nothing without rigorous argument—for every idea has a unique place in this world no matter its membership to particular traditions or derivations.
The PA precedes tradition. No matter what your school of thought, it is true that every member of any school (whether they be conflicting or in agreement) thinks about the world in a particular way. The philosophical attitude is held by those who don’t purport to be the members of schools or traditions. The PA has no prerequisite other than being: it requires perceptiveness, breath, awareness, interest, curiosity, and an embracing of confusion. It is prone to seeking without hesitation. It moves toward every stimulus. It asks, it responds to the questions it poses to itself.
The PA seeks to generate responses to questions; it seeks things to find things to say about the world. It observes, asks, synthesizes, ambles through confusion with a human-like manner of serenity. It is skeptical, it is decisive, it laughs. It thrives on absurdity and knit-picking through contradiction. It sorts out. It mulls over. It follows any path, it makes random travel plans. It is not philosophy per say, it is the origin of philosophy—the germ or bacteria that causes philosophy. Philosophy is a symptom of the philosophical attitude. It is the seed that has bloomed through the history of abstraction, of writing, of creation—from the authors of the Gita to authors of Finnegan’s Wake or Principia Mathematica. It is Wittgenstein pacing in front of Russell. It is Sartre scratching in a notebook during WWII. It is Socrates sleeping on the street. It is Rorty ejecting. It is Jesus struggling. It is held by those frustrated with being and are aware of this feeling, it is the mindset of the fascinated, of the overwhelmed. It is the desire to be familiar with that which is unfamiliar. It is the geyser of theory, the praiser of beauty, the creator of logical systems, the motivation behind each and every question asked—it is a kind of child-function in all of us. Our amazement with life, our desire to pursue its expression, its origin, its argument. It is with all of us: writers, readers, continentals, Marxists, realists, sketpcis, fanatics, Nietzscheans, Quineans, and Hegelians. It is why we are here, and we must nurture it. It is the root and banner of our new Positivism. The philosophical attitude is in teenagers, the elderly, the unemployed, the rich, the destitute, and the very young. As philosophical positivists we remember and cherish this, we mind everyone around us: those in line for bagels, at conferences, in classrooms, when getting gas. We live this. We laugh wherever we go; we travel when walking down the block.
As positivists, we take this mindset and we let it loose on the conventions that have formed around us, on the supposed walls built by traditions of pageantry, disinterest, and close-mindedness, all born from paranoia. We must allow ourselves peek over those walls, dig underneath them, break them down if necessary. It is imperative that we do so! It is the PA that will guide us through them, around them, and under them. PhiPoz is for anyone curious, it concerns us all, academics and non-academics. There will be positivists who have never read Descartes, never debated Plato, never learned the lingo or jargon of traditional philosophical schools. They might be shop-owners, train conductors, little sisters, enemies, soldiers, politicians. And there will be even more entrenched in the tradition who plug their ears to the call for a broadening of perspective.
As philosophers have work to do. Those hear this call will seek not only to see the field of ideas, but see the vast field of people and teach them. Be open not only to ideas, to your fellow people for they are the holders of ideas as well—remember that ideas lurk within every corner, every unsuspecting place, the dirtiest vile hallways of your world. These should not be left unexplored.
Positivism is having the attitude. In our field, it is about sewing together the fractured traditions separated by accidental rusting of time, but also the reaching out to those in the world who want to know and ask and be a part of what it means to be human. It is our job to help empower them by showing them what they are capable of, showing them they have the spark, showing them how to nurture it. How to communicate. How to be critical. How to be curious and confused and creative. It is our job to reconstruct, to connect, to be and be open. To be positive.
At this point in the development of the idea, I wish to offer merely a hint, a gesture, a suggestion, a question, an idea. I would ask that, for this session, you put away your tools, your knives, and mortars and pestles that you have accrued from your philosophical training, and let what I am saying infuse your method; see if it resonates. The reason you do philosophy is because you curious, because you are open, because you have a thirst for understanding and amazement with being alive, a fascination with it. Why else would you do philosophy and care about it? You are naturally a positivist. To ignore that is to ignore the foundations of your philosophical inquiry. What I ask you to consider is that this basic attitude be reinvigorated in your philosophical pursuits. Do not let unexamined opinions stand in the way of your fascinations, do not allow the facade of your teacher's expertise sway you completely away from that which interests you. And if you do have arguments as to why particular styles, streams, or ideas are unfruitful, then state them, offer them to us, talk them out.
I am not demanding that we be limp and passive in our engagement with ideas. I am asking that we look at ideas, rather than dismiss them. Think of them critically, originally, and as an inspired thinker looking for the answers that you claim to seek. Let us look at everything with our own interests in mind, with an attitude that something interesting may be there, something we can use.
If you say "well, I just do" then you are no philosopher. If you are a philosopher, I expect more than just a rote statement of unexamined preference. You may maintain this stubbornness, but I will not call you a philosopher if you avoid my question as to why you feel this way. And you will know that you have missed out on the opportunity to have new ideas and ways of thinking about your own questions as a result of your maintenance of theses unexamined opinions. It will be you who lacks the creativity to dissolve problems, you who are limited—you limit yourself philosophically by limiting the terrain your thought covers. Perhaps I can understand my problem of logic by reading Sartre; maybe I can ask a question about Kierkegaard if I understood the behavior of modus ponens and the law of excluded middle. "So Do I have to go read Heidegger? How can I do that is there's so much to know and read in the other traditions? What do you expect of me? We aren't all able to be you; we all can't find connections in disparate areas, and why should we?"
My response: remember why you started doing philosophy in the first place. Remember why you kept at it. Why you cared about it at all. All I am saying is wonder, don't let your first instinct towards something new be a discarding one. Ask yourself why you're closed off to particular approaches and see if your response meets your own criteria for consistency, coherency, and validity...see if it meets the criteria you use to criticize others. Wonder what philosophy is in general, it if it's important to so, why this is so.
And, if nothing else, do not teach your students or your peers or your family members or those you interact with most remotely your closed-mindedness. Do not set their preferences, because they revere and respect you and will consider seriously the things you might have left unexamined but still express habitually.
Also, unlikely places might be familiar ones. Just places where you might not have drawn a connection before you can connect certain types of analytic philosophy to one another to solve problems in a single stream.
//but wait, can’t a positivist still develop the streams? Isn’t that the idea? I can work entirely within the analytic tradition and be positive to continental work? That continental work can influence me although that influence may only be manifest in the language of quantifiers, antecedents, and rigor? (And this might not be a call for every one. We need people continuing to work on the streams, developing them and maintaining them. What I am saying is that there should be a group of people who walk away from the streams and see where and how they all feed into the ocean of thought. But I will stand firm in my claim that if you maintain unexamined preferences towards certain ways of thinking and have no arguments that meet your own standards to dismiss these ways of thinking, and further if you teach these rotted opinions to your students and peers, then you are not a philosopher. I do not think everyone has to be a positivist. But I think that if you call yourself a philosopher, you should act like one.)
If you are so militant against this, then ignore it like you might other silly or uninteresting streams and continue on with your opaque vision. What I ask is that you do not leave your own stones unturned. What I ask is that you come up with a response to my question that meets your own rigorous standards. Do not cheat yourself out of philosophy; do not cheat those around you by closing them off. Then, go on and do what you will. For the rest of us, let's put something together! Let's paint ourselves with the hues mixed by the demolition and examination of the deconstructive movements so popular till now, let's dip our brushes in it and see what pictures of this world we can produce. I think we will be surprised at how interesting, unique, and creative we can be. Let's reconstruct! Let's be philosophical! Let's be Positivists!
Dave Backer
The following document was attached to the email that Backer sent to Caws.
PhiPos Synopsis As of Now
Philosophical positivism is a school of thought that deals with the following:
1) Meta-philosophical questions, such as: What do we do when we do philosophy? Or, a more normative question: What should we do when we do philosophy? What is philosophy and what isn’t philosophy? How does philosophy and philosophical activity relate to the world, how has it come to that particular place, and what’s to come?
2) Personal questions such, as: What does it mean to be a philosopher? How should we approach our philosophical research and how should the academy relate to the world at large?
3) More general questions, such as: What does it mean to be and be human? What is the situation of the human in our world as we experience life?
Philosophical positivism is characterized by particular arguments relating to these general questions. The following are short positivist responses to them.
1) The history of thought, over the past few generations, has produced a markedly deconstructive variety of theories that have taken apart our philosophical methods, view points, and practices piece by piece. All the ideas (constructive and deconstructive) that have shaped the history of thought up till now compose what positivists call the field of ideas. Rather than deconstructive, philosophical positivism is a reconstructive philosophical approach. Positivists argue that when we do philosophy, we should reconstruct—that is, we should look at the various and sundry ideas that have been created via construction and deconstruction (the field) over time and find similarities (what might be called conceptual correlates) in what seem to be disparate areas. These areas are currently (and hurtfully) separated by walls built by philosophical traditions. Postivists believe these walls are transparent, and that the seriousness with which they are currently taken in the philosophical community disrupts philosophical activity, and has muddled what it means to be a philosopher.
2) Reconstruction requires a particular attitude towards ideas and people that is inclusive, and views the production of human thought as a unified whole with many different aspects. Particular attributes are necessary for maintaining this view point. Being a philosopher, positivism says, means having a philosophical attitude. This attitude allows one to do reconstructive philosophy, as well be open-minded, serenely confused, and interested in the entire field of ideas. An important positivistic claim here is that if you do not have arguments to discount a particular way of thinking that meet your own standards of philosophical rigor, then you are not justified in discounting that way of thinking—to others or to yourself. In fact, we believe that it is counter-philosophical do have a sarcastic or closed-minded attitude that is not justified by rigorous argumentation. Therefore, positivists claim, if you persist in maintaining unexamined preference in philosophical research, writing, teaching, and interpreting and convey those unjustified opinions to others then you have lost the philosophical attitude and are not a philosopher.
3) Positivism predicts that the finding of conceptual correlates in seemingly disparate areas of the field of ideas will produce new and interesting conclusions about what it means to be human. When symmetry is found between different locuses of thought within the field we may be in a position to conclude that a greater, more important facet of the human situation has been found. Therefore, reconstruction aims generally to reconstruct a theory of being human.
Essay
Seeing the field of activity, the wanting to take elements seriously and put them together to say something about being. Philosophical positivism is about an approach, an understanding, open-mindedness, connections. We've deconstructed enough! We need to put ourselves back together! This is the work of philosophers.
We've exhausted deconstruction. It has led us to ‘clarity’ of thought, but has it brought us any closer to that which we seek? To the knowledge that drives us? What it means to be human? We’ve taken things apart in our paranoia and, I think, in our passionate deconstructive search of language, we've lost sight of something. We’ve lost sight of why we started deconstructing in the first place—what led us to begin this incredible task of taking apart language and method. We’ve lost sight of the reason why we started doing philosophy in the first place. Now we need to blaze a new trail with our old companions, the traditions of philosophical thought. We need to join together and observe the richness of the field of ideas with open eyes for each of its components.
What is the field of ideas? It is the landscape containing each of the conceptual structures that have developed over the history of human thought. It is the frothing, conflicting amusement park of realisms, mysticisms, logical hierarchies that have been offered by thinkers over time. Some of these structures are those that were constructed to deconstruct earlier theories. Over time, theories have been offered, and theories about the problems with these theories have been offered. The latter are those deconstructive philosophies that alert us to the ambiguities of language, the inability of language to express what we want to express and express it honestly. These stand in the same company of those ancient, medieval, and modern theories that were supposed to be dissolved by the deconstructive ones. Now we stand at a point in history where we can see a tradition of deconstruction and survey the territory. This vantage point must be taken advantage of. It must be utilized. We must now reconstruct, observing all theories up till now and piecing together the disparate sections to produce new ideas within and without our home theoretical territories.
The seers of the field must let no unargued opinion close their minds. We must not be blinded by unkempt and rusty idols passed down to us by our myopic teachers. Cast aside presupposed conceptions of theoretical legitimacy—our search should be one for knowledge and elucidation independent of the halls of tradition. We must seek to learn in whatever direction our thoughts take us, and we must seek the relationships between different ideas: for these connections are the strongest bonds between the progressive thoughts and the reliable, but slightly battered and worn-out positions of thinkers past. To seek in this way is to enter into research without the blindfolds of unjustified preference. To help others seek in this way is to teach what it means to enter research thus.
To seek in this way, to see the field of ideas, to reconstruct properly we must revisit what it means to be philosophical, to be a philosopher—what it means to possess a philosophical attitude (PA).
The PA is an attitude of wonderment; it is a gentle, naive, paradoxical trait. Possessing entails the love of wisdom, whether this is the sparkling pattern of lights on a building, the relationships between mathematical formulae, logical proofs, or inspiring bits of literature, art, conversation, or pop culture. The philosophical attitude is an attitude that condones meeting each and every medium, school of thought, or person on its own ground. The philosophical attitude is curious about the world, and therefore seeks to find out from each and every disparate locus of thought what that locus has to offer. It slanders nothing without rigorous argument—for every idea has a unique place in this world no matter its membership to particular traditions or derivations.
The PA precedes tradition. No matter what your school of thought, it is true that every member of any school (whether they be conflicting or in agreement) thinks about the world in a particular way. The philosophical attitude is held by those who don’t purport to be the members of schools or traditions. The PA has no prerequisite other than being: it requires perceptiveness, breath, awareness, interest, curiosity, and an embracing of confusion. It is prone to seeking without hesitation. It moves toward every stimulus. It asks, it responds to the questions it poses to itself.
The PA seeks to generate responses to questions; it seeks things to find things to say about the world. It observes, asks, synthesizes, ambles through confusion with a human-like manner of serenity. It is skeptical, it is decisive, it laughs. It thrives on absurdity and knit-picking through contradiction. It sorts out. It mulls over. It follows any path, it makes random travel plans. It is not philosophy per say, it is the origin of philosophy—the germ or bacteria that causes philosophy. Philosophy is a symptom of the philosophical attitude. It is the seed that has bloomed through the history of abstraction, of writing, of creation—from the authors of the Gita to authors of Finnegan’s Wake or Principia Mathematica. It is Wittgenstein pacing in front of Russell. It is Sartre scratching in a notebook during WWII. It is Socrates sleeping on the street. It is Rorty ejecting. It is Jesus struggling. It is held by those frustrated with being and are aware of this feeling, it is the mindset of the fascinated, of the overwhelmed. It is the desire to be familiar with that which is unfamiliar. It is the geyser of theory, the praiser of beauty, the creator of logical systems, the motivation behind each and every question asked—it is a kind of child-function in all of us. Our amazement with life, our desire to pursue its expression, its origin, its argument. It is with all of us: writers, readers, continentals, Marxists, realists, sketpcis, fanatics, Nietzscheans, Quineans, and Hegelians. It is why we are here, and we must nurture it. It is the root and banner of our new Positivism. The philosophical attitude is in teenagers, the elderly, the unemployed, the rich, the destitute, and the very young. As philosophical positivists we remember and cherish this, we mind everyone around us: those in line for bagels, at conferences, in classrooms, when getting gas. We live this. We laugh wherever we go; we travel when walking down the block.
As positivists, we take this mindset and we let it loose on the conventions that have formed around us, on the supposed walls built by traditions of pageantry, disinterest, and close-mindedness, all born from paranoia. We must allow ourselves peek over those walls, dig underneath them, break them down if necessary. It is imperative that we do so! It is the PA that will guide us through them, around them, and under them. PhiPoz is for anyone curious, it concerns us all, academics and non-academics. There will be positivists who have never read Descartes, never debated Plato, never learned the lingo or jargon of traditional philosophical schools. They might be shop-owners, train conductors, little sisters, enemies, soldiers, politicians. And there will be even more entrenched in the tradition who plug their ears to the call for a broadening of perspective.
As philosophers have work to do. Those hear this call will seek not only to see the field of ideas, but see the vast field of people and teach them. Be open not only to ideas, to your fellow people for they are the holders of ideas as well—remember that ideas lurk within every corner, every unsuspecting place, the dirtiest vile hallways of your world. These should not be left unexplored.
Positivism is having the attitude. In our field, it is about sewing together the fractured traditions separated by accidental rusting of time, but also the reaching out to those in the world who want to know and ask and be a part of what it means to be human. It is our job to help empower them by showing them what they are capable of, showing them they have the spark, showing them how to nurture it. How to communicate. How to be critical. How to be curious and confused and creative. It is our job to reconstruct, to connect, to be and be open. To be positive.
At this point in the development of the idea, I wish to offer merely a hint, a gesture, a suggestion, a question, an idea. I would ask that, for this session, you put away your tools, your knives, and mortars and pestles that you have accrued from your philosophical training, and let what I am saying infuse your method; see if it resonates. The reason you do philosophy is because you curious, because you are open, because you have a thirst for understanding and amazement with being alive, a fascination with it. Why else would you do philosophy and care about it? You are naturally a positivist. To ignore that is to ignore the foundations of your philosophical inquiry. What I ask you to consider is that this basic attitude be reinvigorated in your philosophical pursuits. Do not let unexamined opinions stand in the way of your fascinations, do not allow the facade of your teacher's expertise sway you completely away from that which interests you. And if you do have arguments as to why particular styles, streams, or ideas are unfruitful, then state them, offer them to us, talk them out.
I am not demanding that we be limp and passive in our engagement with ideas. I am asking that we look at ideas, rather than dismiss them. Think of them critically, originally, and as an inspired thinker looking for the answers that you claim to seek. Let us look at everything with our own interests in mind, with an attitude that something interesting may be there, something we can use.
If you say "well, I just do" then you are no philosopher. If you are a philosopher, I expect more than just a rote statement of unexamined preference. You may maintain this stubbornness, but I will not call you a philosopher if you avoid my question as to why you feel this way. And you will know that you have missed out on the opportunity to have new ideas and ways of thinking about your own questions as a result of your maintenance of theses unexamined opinions. It will be you who lacks the creativity to dissolve problems, you who are limited—you limit yourself philosophically by limiting the terrain your thought covers. Perhaps I can understand my problem of logic by reading Sartre; maybe I can ask a question about Kierkegaard if I understood the behavior of modus ponens and the law of excluded middle. "So Do I have to go read Heidegger? How can I do that is there's so much to know and read in the other traditions? What do you expect of me? We aren't all able to be you; we all can't find connections in disparate areas, and why should we?"
My response: remember why you started doing philosophy in the first place. Remember why you kept at it. Why you cared about it at all. All I am saying is wonder, don't let your first instinct towards something new be a discarding one. Ask yourself why you're closed off to particular approaches and see if your response meets your own criteria for consistency, coherency, and validity...see if it meets the criteria you use to criticize others. Wonder what philosophy is in general, it if it's important to so, why this is so.
And, if nothing else, do not teach your students or your peers or your family members or those you interact with most remotely your closed-mindedness. Do not set their preferences, because they revere and respect you and will consider seriously the things you might have left unexamined but still express habitually.
Also, unlikely places might be familiar ones. Just places where you might not have drawn a connection before you can connect certain types of analytic philosophy to one another to solve problems in a single stream.
//but wait, can’t a positivist still develop the streams? Isn’t that the idea? I can work entirely within the analytic tradition and be positive to continental work? That continental work can influence me although that influence may only be manifest in the language of quantifiers, antecedents, and rigor? (And this might not be a call for every one. We need people continuing to work on the streams, developing them and maintaining them. What I am saying is that there should be a group of people who walk away from the streams and see where and how they all feed into the ocean of thought. But I will stand firm in my claim that if you maintain unexamined preferences towards certain ways of thinking and have no arguments that meet your own standards to dismiss these ways of thinking, and further if you teach these rotted opinions to your students and peers, then you are not a philosopher. I do not think everyone has to be a positivist. But I think that if you call yourself a philosopher, you should act like one.)
If you are so militant against this, then ignore it like you might other silly or uninteresting streams and continue on with your opaque vision. What I ask is that you do not leave your own stones unturned. What I ask is that you come up with a response to my question that meets your own rigorous standards. Do not cheat yourself out of philosophy; do not cheat those around you by closing them off. Then, go on and do what you will. For the rest of us, let's put something together! Let's paint ourselves with the hues mixed by the demolition and examination of the deconstructive movements so popular till now, let's dip our brushes in it and see what pictures of this world we can produce. I think we will be surprised at how interesting, unique, and creative we can be. Let's reconstruct! Let's be philosophical! Let's be Positivists!
Meeting Debriefing--David Backer
In an email to the Washington Circle, January 26 2007
Yo, so we didn't do much BetterNewsing last night. But we did some. I read this thing aloud and we talked about it a little bit. I thought putting it in an email would inspire some more discussion. We agree that next week at 9 we'd get to business with the writings.
See what you think, it's very rough: I wrote it like something that would be spoken in front of a group of people.
There is much talk of peace. There has always been such talk. The explanation for this is not our concern here --let us just admit that peace is a goal we hope to attain personally and politically.There are differences among us. There are things that hold us together. There are things that bring us to each other's side, there are things that cause us to harm one another. Differences will tend to inspire the latter, while similarities will aid the former.So many say that we must come together. That we must love each other. That we must have peace.But what does this mean?How do we amplify our similarities and understand our differences so that our paths toward one another are not blocked?We cannot just say that there must be peace. We must think about one another, about ourselves, so that this movement towards peace can occur. Because it is a movement, it is a walk, a way of being, not a series of sentences to be repeated. It is an attitude that causes our movements towards each other. Nations are only only individuals that believe together. If we believe with the attitude of peace, there can be such a thing as a peaceful nation.We call this attitude the philosophical attitude. The philosophical attitude is a way of being that clears a path toward understanding at the individual level. It is a starting place, at least. An individual with this attitude works to find the similarities between seemingly antagonistic or anti-thetical ideas. An individual with this attitude sees that the world is full of people.An individual with this attitude believes, if nothing else, that there are truths of human nature, and that anything produced by that nature is somehow indicative of one its essential aspects. An individual with this attitude says the word "interesting" in response to almost everything. An individual with this attitude will engage anyone in a discussion about anything. An individual with this attitude will ask "what do you mean" until nauseous. An individual with this attitude will, if nothing else, appreciate how things are more similar than they seem, or, appreciate the beauty of how different things are. An individual with this attitude will rarely say the word "hate", unless its usage is clearly justified. An individual with this attitude can be from anywhere-- can be any age, belong to any religion, any race, any culture, any society.
muchlove,derv
What is the Philosophical Attitude (Steve Wood, November 25, 2006)
An email from Steve Wood precedes this document:
hey everyone.
attached is a short short short one-pager with a couple of my thoughts on the philosophical attitude. actually, its more about the difference between and annotative and denotative definition but perhaps that will be helpful for some of you in sorting out your thoughts. let me know what you think and we can refine and refine the PA.
looking forward to reading what you guys think and getting cracking on some other philosophy-like writing!
i hope you all had a delightful weekend,
steve
What is the Philosophical Attitude?
Steve Wood
25 November 06
A Discourse on Method
As I began to break down my ideas on the Philosophical Attitude (PA), I realized that I needed to make a decision between two definitional tactics: the annotative definition and the denotative definition. I've chosen to lay out a denotative definition of the PA. But before I elaborate on the specifics of my definition, I am going to describe what I see to be the difference between the annotative and denotative definitions and why I've chosen the latter for this particular project.
An annotative definition is a concise phrase-form description of an idea which thematically unites (or hopes to unite) instances of the concept being defined. Dictionary definitions are annotative definitions.
My parents' Webster's New World Dictionary defines nonviolence as "an abstaining from violence or from the use of physical force, as in efforts to obtain civil rights or in opposing government policy." This is annotative; it expresses a definition in a phrase-form and it unites various instances of nonviolence-- hunger striking in political protest, self-sacrifice for the well-being of another, refusal to capitulate to the demands of an aggressor, et cetera--into a singular definition.
A denotative definition, on the other hand, is a definition which is itself an enumeration of instances of the concept. In the example given above, a denotative definition of nonviolence would consist of: hunger striking, self-sacrifice, refusal to capitulate, and others. A denotative has obvious limitations. In instances where the crucial instances of a concept are multifarious and wide-ranging, relying on a denotative definition is exceptionally cumbersome. However, there are clear benefits to a denotative definition. It is not as vulnerable to the process of over-abstraction that is necessary to frame myriad instances into a single unifying phrase-form. A denotative definition is not necessarily ever complete. A denotative list simply must be sufficient to convey the sense--or perhaps phenomenology--of a concept. An annotative definition seems to purport to be conclusive and decisive.
Defining the PA
In defining the PA, we ought to begin with a denotative definition for two reasons. First, it is difficult to unify instances of a concept in a single phrase-form if we cannot enumerate those instances to begin with. If we have difficulty jumping right into an annotative definition, we might be well off to start with a denotative one. Second, I think the lack of rigidity that accompanies a denotative definition is appropriate for the lack of rigidity that we seem to be trying to capture with our understanding of the PA. In fact, rigidity seems to even be antithetical to the PA. So, what is our denotative definition of the PA? I see the following as necessary characteristics for someone to posses if she also posses a PA:
1) Genuine and honest curiosity regarding the elucidation of truth
2) Willingness to co-operate with other philosophical traditions and methods to elucidate this truth
3) A cross-analytic capacity (CAC). The CAC enables one to draw meaningful parallels between to seemingly different approaches to a similar concept (or similar approaches to different concepts) in order to make progress towards elucidating truth. (See Backer 2005)
4) A desire to pursue truth not for self-aggrandizement and the quest for scholarly remittances, but out of general concern for organic personal satisfaction.
With all these constituent parts combined, I am the Philosophical Attitude!
Why "Knocked Up" is a Positive Movie--David Backer (an email to Stephen Wood and Thom Gennaro, June 14th 2007)
I think "Knocked Up" is a positive movie. Remember that positivism is a school of thought that encourages the bringing-together of seemingly disparate ideas. A movie is positive if it (1) includes two main themes that people seem to think are antithetical, opposite, or dissonant with one another and (2) uses the combination of those ideas to converge on a new, more subtle understanding of some greater theme. Usually this third theme has to do with a truth about human nature or what it is like to be human. I think "Knocked Up" does both of these things. The two disparate themes I think are play in this movie are:(A) The reality and humor of "inappropriate" behavior: eg. laziness, drug use, brutish jokes about body parts, a generally laid back attitude toward life, hedonistic, drunken, pre-marital sexual intercourse with strangers, stuff you don't really want your mother knowing about, etc. (B) The importance of "family values"; eg. responsibility, and commitment to the well-being of others through the abnegation of purely pleasurable and/or selfish acts. The first half of the movie develops two characters, Ben and Allyson. He's an American reject: He has no job. He is from Canada. He lives in American illegally. He doesn't pay taxes. He lives off of money that he did not work for. He is unshaven, round, and tactless. He lives in lazy squalor: his house is a mess, his friends are well-meaning but vulgar degenerates. They get drunk, smoke pot, and spend most of their time finding new ways to be inappropriate. Their only work-related initiative is a pornography website whose purpose is to tell the user the number of minutes of female nudity in popular movies (though this website is far from completed). It seems that Ben's only redeeming quality is that he doesn't actively wish others harm. Allyson is an American dream: She has a great job in the entertainment business and is getting promoted. She is intelligent and nice. She has a good relationship with her sister. She is beautiful, blond, and has an incredible body. Allyson is going somewhere and is doing everything right. We encounter theme A. Ben and Allyson both do what any normal or almost normal human being over the age of 21 does on a Saturday night. They go to a bar where other normal or almost normal human beings are and drink alcohol. Ben and Allyson meet and, finding they don't abhor one another's company, drink massive amounts of alcohol at the bar. Allyson takes Ben back to her apartment and, like any normal or almost normal human beings in their situation, they have sex. This is accepted behavior in the sense that, culturally, it's not shocking when two single strangers get drunk and have sexual intercourse. There are many people who do this, and/or continually hope they can do it in the future. The sexual act in these situations is completely stripped of emotional depth and seriousness in the name of physical pleasure. Ben and Allyson don't think about sexually transmitted diseases or pregnancy enough to stop (they think to use a condom, but Allyson says "just do it" when Ben takes too long). Nor do they let the fact that they don't know anything about each other get in the way. It doesn't matter that they have no emotional connection. They just want to feel good. And they're drunk. So they have sex. To a majority of viewing audiences, this isn't shocking. Some might think it's wrong. But it's not unusual. I think the humor throughout this movie, the scatological and "inappropriate" kinds of jokes about body parts, contributes to theme A. Usually, those who take sexual intercourse seriously as an emotionally deep act don't make light of it. And Ben and his friends are definitely examples of people you would never want to take to church or bring home to mom. The movie continues and Allyson finds out that she's pregnant. After consulting her mother and her sister, she is presented with the option of abortion. She finds Ben and tells him that she is pregnant. She decides to keep the baby, and Ben decides to do his best to help her. These two decisions are what make theme B possible in this movie. Despite Ben's laziness, despite Allyson's career and initial distaste for Ben's personality, they each decide to act responsibly. They both decide to do something good that is not just for themselves, but for the well-being of others. Allyson makes the decision not to end the putative life of her baby and Ben decides not to run away from the responsibility of bringing that life into the world. The rest of the movie is devoted to their overall success in this, despite some bumps in the road. In the end, they show a commitment to something greater than their own physical pleasure. Ben and Allyson don't have sex because they agree it is a better idea to get to know one another. Ben reads baby books. He moves out of his friends' house. He gets a job. He helps Allyson pick gynecologists. He gets to know her family. He refuses to go out with his friends. Allyson works despite her pregnancy. These are all behaviors that show how this movie is a family values movie, that is has theme B. Again, a positive movie is one that has two seemingly disparate themes and shows how these themes converge on a more subtle understanding of some greater theme about human nature. The great thing about "Knocked Up" is that it shows us how humans can be selfish and hedonistic, but that it is possible for hedonistic creatures to be virtuous despite their hedonism. It shows how "inappropriate" behavior isn't an indication of the complete moral generation our of society. It shows us that we can be "inappropriate" and virtuous; that, conceptually, inappropriateness does not exclude virtue, responsibility, and depth. It shows that us both of these qualities exist in our culture, exist in our selves, but that they are not mutually exclusive qualities. It shows us that yes, we do in fact seek purely physical and selfish pleasure but that, despite this, we are still capable of doing things for deeper reasons. We are more complicated than dogma. "Knocked Up" is a great example of how.
Recorded, Remembered, and Perhaps Continued
If you go to Phillips Hall at The George Washington University and you go to the fifth floor you'll find the philosophy department. It's a quiet, thin, and gray hallway without windows where cork boards line the walls. These boards are filled with posters informing students about lectures and conferences on consciousness or truth or literature, or announcements about upcoming meetings or fliers for graduate programs.
Halfway down the hallway, outside the third office to your right, there is a small cork board with a few old postings pinned to it. If you look at the top section of this cork board you will see a piece of paper, folded now at the corners, with the following title:
"PhiPos: A Summary Up Till Now."
This is a document that was produced after the first official meeting of what came to be called the Washington Circle. The Circle formed in 2006 around the tenets of what came to be called Positivism (shortened from Philosophical Positivism, or PhiPos) by its members. Among other statements of purpose written by members of the Circle, there were fruitful and energetic conversations had, letters written to well-known artists and thinkers, stickers designed, meetings held, and a book club proposed for the summer of 2006.
Since that time there has been no new activity from the Washington Circle, and thus work on the New Positivism has ceased. This blog seeks, at its most hopeful, to galvanize it. Here, you will find all the (traceable) documents and contributions that gave birth to and sustained this short-lived school of thought. We do this with the hope that the school's tenets, what it stands for, remain extant in some way. Maybe new contributions can be made with this documentation...maybe Positivism will be found retroactively to be moot or done-before or irrelevant. Whatever the case may be, the Washington Circle and its New Positivism existed, and it is our opinion that the work of the Washington Circle be recorded, remembered, and perhaps continued.
Halfway down the hallway, outside the third office to your right, there is a small cork board with a few old postings pinned to it. If you look at the top section of this cork board you will see a piece of paper, folded now at the corners, with the following title:
"PhiPos: A Summary Up Till Now."
This is a document that was produced after the first official meeting of what came to be called the Washington Circle. The Circle formed in 2006 around the tenets of what came to be called Positivism (shortened from Philosophical Positivism, or PhiPos) by its members. Among other statements of purpose written by members of the Circle, there were fruitful and energetic conversations had, letters written to well-known artists and thinkers, stickers designed, meetings held, and a book club proposed for the summer of 2006.
Since that time there has been no new activity from the Washington Circle, and thus work on the New Positivism has ceased. This blog seeks, at its most hopeful, to galvanize it. Here, you will find all the (traceable) documents and contributions that gave birth to and sustained this short-lived school of thought. We do this with the hope that the school's tenets, what it stands for, remain extant in some way. Maybe new contributions can be made with this documentation...maybe Positivism will be found retroactively to be moot or done-before or irrelevant. Whatever the case may be, the Washington Circle and its New Positivism existed, and it is our opinion that the work of the Washington Circle be recorded, remembered, and perhaps continued.
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